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The Evolving Doctrine of Union Liability
For Health and Safety in the
Workplace. Warning: Collective
Bargaining Can Be Hazardous to
Your Union's Health
Jeffrey S. Wohlner*t
I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
In the last fifteen years, a body of law has developed under a the-
ory that certain provisions in a collective bargaining agreement con-
cerning safety enforcement and a union's responsibility thereunder
create a legal obligation for the union to perform certain duties ex-
pected of it under such provisions. The degree and extent of those
duties are the roots of the controversy and, hence, the subject of this
article.
Many cases have been pled in terms of a common law negligence
action against the union where it fails to perform a duty it undertook
or fails to undertake a duty. These cases attempt to sever a common
law claim of negligence from the duty of fair representation with re-
spect to the functions of a union in labor agreements under the
health and safety provisions.
* Jeffrey S. Wohlner is a Partner with the firm of Wohlner, Kaplon, Phillips,
Vogel, Shelley & Young, where he represents labor unions in arbitration as well as in
civil litigation generally. He was with the California Attorney General's Criminal Ap-
peals, Civil Prosecution Division for licensing agencies and the State Personnel Board,
1968-72. He was Chairman of Private Sector Labor Relations Committee of the Cali-
fornia State Bar Labor and Employment Section in 1983, and a member of the Execu-
tive Board for the Committee in 1984-85. B.A., University of Iowa, 1965; J.D.,
Creighton University, 1968. He was admitted to California and Nebraska State Bars,
1969.
t I accept full responsibility for any and all inconsistencies in this article, as well as
for all views and opinions expressed. Nevertheless, I would like to thank my Partner,
Michael J. Shelley, for his invaluable editorial assistance in making the writing of this
article possible.
The more accurate and better reasoned decisions have dealt with
the cases in terms of a breach of the duty of fair representation
which arises under federal law. A minority of decisions have held
that the union's duty is that of due care under state tort law, instead
of the duty of fair representation under federal law. On balance, the
unions have prevailed in the majority of decisions.
This discussion will trace the theory from its embryonic stages
through what presently may be a predictable stage. Along the way
there will be mutations and deviations from this ordered pattern of
development. Hopefully, the pronouncement from the United States
Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck 1 is the DNA parti-
cle needed to rid the system of mutations and make life develop
somewhat easier for labor unions.
A. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
In Allis-Chalmers, the Court issued what appeared to be a far-
reaching decision linking tort claim liability with collective bargain-
ing agreements and clarified the judicial analysis to be applied.
In that case, a United Auto Workers collective bargaining agree-
ment had provided for a self-funded disability plan administered by
Aetna Life Insurance. Benefits were to be provided for nonoccupa-
tional injuries. Further, the contract provided for a disability griev-
ance procedure and binding arbitration.
After sustaining a nonoccupational injury, the employee filed a bad
faith tort claim against the employer and Aetna in state court. The
trial court determined that the matter was preempted by section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act.2 Following affirmation by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, 3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, finding
the matter to be a tort claim rather than a contract claim.4
When the matter reached the United States Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, held that:
[Wlhen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon anal-
ysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, that claim must either
be treated as a [section] 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-
contract law. Here, respondent's claim should have been dismissed for failure
to make use of the grievance procedure or as preempted by [section] 301. The
right asserted by respondent is rooted in contract, and the bad-faith claim
could have been pleaded as a contract claim under [section] 301. Unless fed-
1. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
2. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1975) (generally providing that suits for violations of collective-bargaining agreements
may be brought in federal district court).
3. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins., 112 Wis. 2d 675, 333 N.W.2d 733 (1983), rev'd, 116 Wis.
2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699 (1984), cert granted sub nom. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
469 U.S. 815 (1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
4. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699 (1984), cert. granted
sub nom., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 469 U.S. 815 (1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
[Vol. 14: 601, 1987] Union Liability for Health and Safety
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
eral law governs that claim, the meaning of the disability-benefit provisions of
the collective-bargaining agreement would be subject to varying interpreta-
tions, and the congressional goal of a unified body of labor-contract law would
be subverted. Preemption is also necessary to preserve the central role of ar-
bitration in the resolution of labor disputes.
5
Justice Blackmun observed that the issue before the Court was
whether section 301 preempts a state-law tort action for bad faith de-
lay in making disability-benefit payments due under a collective bar-
gaining agreement.
Following a review of preemption and its purposes, the Court
opined that the preemptive effect of section 301 "must extend beyond
suits alleging contract violations. These policies require that 'the re-
lationships created by [a collective bargaining] agreement' be defined
by application of 'an evolving federal common law grounded in na-
tional labor policy .... 6
In short, if a state law purports to define the scope or interpreta-
tion of a contract term, federal labor law preempts the state law. If
state law were allowed to determine the meaning intended by the
parties in adopting a particular phrase or term, the parties would be
uncertain as to what they were binding themselves to when they cre-
ated a right to collective benefits.
The Court made it clear, however, that not every dispute covering
employment, or tangentially involving a portion of a labor contract, is
preempted. "Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not
exist independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be
waived or altered by agreement of private parties, are preempted by
those agreements .... 7
Thus, the question turns on whether the state tort is sufficiently
independent of federal contract interpretation to avoid preemption.
Such a decision is, in itself, a question of federal law. The test is
whether the resolution of a state claim is substantially dependent
upon the meaning of certain terms in a labor agreement. If so, the
claim is to be treated as a section 301 action or be dismissed as pre-
empted by federal law.
The Court had no trouble finding, among other things, that arbitra-
tion under the contract must be preserved. Failure to exhaust the es-
tablished grievance machinery makes such a system ineffective and
5. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 202-03. The quoted material is taken from the syl-
labus prepared by the Reporter of Decisions and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the court.
6. Id at 210-11.
7. Id. at 213.
undermines a central theme of federal labor law-that an arbitrator,
not a court, has the responsibility to interpret a labor contract in the
initial instance.
B. Michigan Mutuals and Hechler9-Preview
Following Allis-Chalmers, two decisions were rendered which dealt
with the issue of a union's duty of due care in the workplace. Both
cases, emanating from the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, respectively,
raised the question of whether such a duty existed by reference to,
and through an interpretation of, the collective bargaining
agreements.
The decision in Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. v. United Steel-
workers of AmericaXO followed the majority of cases holding that the
state tort for alleged negligence by the union had been preempted by
federal law because the tort of negligence arose out of, or was inex-
tricably connected with, the collective bargaining agreement. More-
over, any duty which the union may have undertaken was not the
duty of due care. The court held that the only duty a union had in
that instance was fair representation by reason of being the statutory
bargaining agent.
One month after Michigan Mutual was decided, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit permitted a state tort negligence claim against the union to
proceed in state court in Hechler v. International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers."l In Hechler, the employee sued the union be-
cause her training by the union was negligent and resulted in a job-
related injury. By merely looking at the nature of the complaint, the
remedy sought, and the absence of a claim in federal labor law, the
court held that the case was not preempted by federal law even
though the case required that the collective bargaining agreement be
interpreted in some fashion. In this instance, the court held that the
subject matter was independent of the contract.
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Hechler.12 In its decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Allis-Chalmers,1 3 confirmed Michigan Mutual,14 and vacated and re-
manded Hechler.15
8. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 774 F.2d 104 (6th Cir.
1985).
9. Hechler v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers AFL-CIO, 772 F.2d 788, reh'g
denied, 778 F.2d 793 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1967 (1986).
10. 774 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1985).
11. Hechler, 772 F.2d at 788.
12. Hechler v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 107 S. Ct. 2161 (May, 1987).
13. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. 202.
14. Michigan Mut. Ins., 774 F.2d 104.
15. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. at 2161.
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The Court held that, where a state tort cause of action, which re-
lies upon the breach of a collective bargaining agreement and an in-
terpretation thereof, is not sufficiently independent of the agreement
to permit the state action, it is preempted. Further, labor contract
disputes require resolution by reference to federal common law.16
Thus, the meaning given a contract phrase must be subject to uni-
form federal interpretation under the preemptive force of section
30117 whether the question arises in the context of a suit for breach
of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort.
The Court reviewed the scope and development of preemption as
set forth in Allis-Chalmers.18 It noted that the courts have developed
and defined the range of claims which fall within section 301.19 But
when the Court had the opportunity to significantly clarify exactly
which claims will fall within section 301, it did not go far enough to
affirm or deny the principles set forth in the lower court cases dis-
cussed below. The Court failed to flatly address and completely ex-
haust the issue of whether a union's duty of fair representation
encompasses the duty of due care. The Court concluded that since
the court of appeals held that the claim was preempted under federal
labor law, it remanded the case for further review to determine
whether the statute of limitations had run pursuant to DelCostello v.
Teamsters.20
One caveat remains apparent. Indeed, if a union assumes the duty
of due care, then allegations of negligence become more significant.
In the last analysis, "questions of contract interpretation... underlie
any finding of tort liability."21
It is with distinct purpose that Hechler and Michigan Mutual will
not receive a full review and analysis until later in this paper. To
reach such analysis, the author feels that a history of the cases pre-
ceding them should be reviewed so that a complete historical per-
spective can be attained.
16. Id. at 2164.
17. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1975).
18. Id at 2170.
19. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 218.
20. DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
21. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 218.
C Case History
1. Vaca v. Sipes
At this juncture, a history of how this area developed is appropri-
ate. However, any history must be prefaced by some comments rela-
tive to Vaca v. Sipes.22
In Vaca, the Court reasoned that, because a union was the exclu-
sive bargaining agent, its duty was statutory. As such, this statutory
duty carried with it the responsibility to represent fairly all persons
in the bargaining unit. Indeed, the union's statutory obligation is to
"serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimina-
tion toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith
and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct .... 23
After discussing the union's duty, the Court focused upon the pre-
emption doctrine. Noting the need for the doctrine-to avoid con-
flicting rules of substantive law in the labor relations area and the
desirability of leaving the development of such rules to Congress-
the Court developed language which would become the precursor to
Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck:
While these exceptions [state remedies] in no way undermine the vitality of
the preemption rule where applicable, they demonstrate that the decision to
preempt federal and state court jurisdiction over a given class of cases must
depend upon the nature of the particular interests being asserted and the ef-
fect upon the administration of national labor policies of concurrent judicial
and administrative remedies.24
2. Brough v. United Steelworkers of America
Some fifteen years ago, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Brough v. United Steelworkers of America,25 had an opportunity to
examine "safety in the workplace" as it applied to unions.
Mr. Brough was injured while operating an allegedly faulty
machine. Although he received workers' compensation benefits, he
brought suit in state court against the union on the basis that the
union negligently failed to discover a defect in the machine which re-
sulted in the injury (a union safety committee was in existence at the
time). Moreover, the complaint alleged that the union members
were the employer's "safety advisors."
Once the matter was removed to federal court, Brough amended
22. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
23. Id. at 177.
24. Id. at 180 (emphasis added). In footnote nine, the Supreme Court noted, in
what later would be crucial in Allis-Chalmers and Michigan Mutual, the existence of a
grievance/arbitration procedure. If that procedure were not intended to be an exclu-
sive remedy, then a suit for breach of contract would be proper without regard to ex-
haustion of internal procedures. Id. at 180 n.9 (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U.S. 650, 657-58 (1965)).
25. 437 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1971).
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the complaint to include a second claim: a contractual breach of the
union's duty of fair representation. In defense, the union argued the
limitation of its duty under the Taft-Hartley Act was applicable, as-
serting that any duty owed was derived from federal law.26
The court granted summary judgment for the union, holding that,
since the union was the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees,
the only duty it owed was that of good faith representation. The duty
did not encompass a general duty of due care.
The First Circuit's decision is not blessed with a more exhaustive
analysis of the scope of the union's undertaking as a safety commit-
tee, or the extent of its duties, if any, to inspect, report, and/or rec-
tify. Additionally, there is no mention of the arbitration clause and
its scope. It seems clear that the First Circuit should have decided
the federal question as it related to the negligence claim, or at least
remanded the case back to the district court to make this determina-
tion.27 Although faced with the authority of Vaca v. Sipes, the
Brough court did not reach the question of the effect of this type of
suit on national labor policy. It seemingly viewed the "nature of the
particular interest" as strictly a common law negligence action with-
out regard to the interplay of the collective bargaining agreement
with federal labor policy. 28
If the union owed no duty for a breach of fair representation as the
exclusive bargaining agent, it should have followed that the tort
claim was enmeshed in the contract claim. However, the Brough
court felt the common law tort claim was a pendant claim. Exercising
its discretion, the Court remanded the matter to the state court to de-
cide the question of liability using federal law.29
26. Id.
27. The Court reasoned that since the district court regarded both counts as being
an allegation of the breach of the union's duty, and since the district court did not con-
sider interpretation of state law necessary, the matter should return to the state fo-
rum. Id at 749-50.
28. Id at 750.
29. The negligence claim was founded on state law principles that an employer's
safety advisors, regardless of their motivation or contractual relationship, are subject
to liability if their machinery inspection negligently fails to discover a defect with a
resultant injury. However, the First Circuit noted that whether such a rule would be
applied by a state court to a union safety committee "is a difficult question." State law,
argued the union, would be an intrusion into an area preempted by Congress. Once in
state court, the union impleaded the company and ultimately a settlement was reached
before trial. Id
3. Bryant v. International Union, United Mine Workers of
America
In Bryant v. International Union, United Mine Workers of
America,30 the Sixth Circuit had the next opportunity to pass on this
subject.
Following a mine explosion which killed several employees, the es-
tates of the deceased individuals brought suit in federal court against
both the employer and the union. The complaint charged that since
the collective bargaining agreement had incorporated the Federal
Mine Safety Code, the company had obligated itself to conform to the
Code's standards. The union, it charged, undertook a duty to enforce
such compliance. The plaintiffs claimed that both parties had failed
to perform their respective duties, thereby leading to a foreseeable
result: the decedents were killed as a consequence of violations of the
Mine Safety Code.3 1 The union, the plaintiffs argued, did not make
periodic inspections of the mine.3 2
The action was commenced as a section 301 suit, and the court
viewed the complaint as one which sought damages for the union's
breach of fair representation. In this case, the role undertaken by
the union relating to safety was a permissive duty (the committee
"may" inspect) rather than an affirmative obligation.3 3
By adopting the Mine Safety Code, the parties had agreed upon the
use of federal inspectors to investigate safety problems. Thus, said
the court, a violation would need to be discovered by an inspector for
liability to attach, and since none was found, the union breached no
duty. The union's liability could not be predicated solely on the fact
that the union headed the safety committee.3 4
The court further held that the union did not have a financial re-
sponsibility due to a failure to compel correction of code violations,
even where inspectors had reported violations.
It would be a mistake of vast proportion to read every power granted the
union by management as creating a corollary contract right in the employee
as against the union. Such interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
would simply deter unions from engaging in the unfettered give and take ne-
gotiations which lie at the heart of the collective bargaining agreement.3 5
In short, the Sixth Circuit found that the only duty which the
union had was the obligation to fairly enforce the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement. With no knowledge of any code vio-
lation, there was no basis for finding a breach.
30. 467 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973).
31. Id at 2 n.3.
32. Id at 3.
33. Id
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5.
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With a word of sympathy to the plight of the bereaved families, the
court tried to correct any misperceptions about their rights: "The an-
swer.., is not to pervert the collective bargaining process by reading
into its instruments a liability which was never contemplated and du-
ties which were never assumed in fact or in theory .... "36
It is interesting that Brough was not cited in the Bryant decision.
In fact, Brough never reached the question of liability of the union
safety committee, as that court viewed the nature of the pleading as
being determinative, instead of considering the relationship of the
collective bargaining agreement vis-a-vis the committee's duty to
act.37
4. Helton v. Hake
A Missouri district court was the next to act in Helton v. Hake.38
In 1973, Mr. Helton died from electrocution after coming into contact
with a high tension power line. The surviving spouse and children
filed suit in state court against the union.39 It was alleged that a job
steward, who was appointed by the international and local unions,
had the responsibility to ensure that no work would be done in a cer-
tain area of the high tension lines until power was off or the safety of
the bargaining unit had been secured. This steward allegedly failed
to enforce the safety rule and, as an agent of the unions, all were now
in the lawsuit.40
The unions removed the case to federal district court,41 stating that
the case against them was, in reality, a section 301 suit because the
allegation was no more than a failure to fully and adequately enforce
the collective bargaining agreement provisions pertaining to safety
rules. Therefore, since an interpretation of the agreement was neces-
sary, federal jurisdiction was available.
In a very questionable ruling, the district court remanded the mat-
ter to state court, based on a tortured analysis: since the complaint
did nothing more than state an action in tort for wrongful death
under state law, the court held that it did not fall within the jurisdic-
tion of section 301.
36. Id at 5-6.
37. If that court had considered the negligence claim merely as a recharacteriza-
tion of the federal claim, the entire case seemingly would have been dismissed.
38. 386 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
39. Other counts sought to hold the city liable pursuant to negligence theory.
40. Helton, 386 F. Supp. at 1028.
41. Id
The court candidly acknowledged that a union member could sue
the union for a redress of rights under the collective bargaining
agreement if the union interfered with such rights. The union's inter-
ference with such rights would need to be shown to establish breach
of the union's duty of fair representation irrespective of whether the
claim was based on a collective bargaining agreement. Naturally, the
standards under Vaca v. Sipes, and subsequent cases at that time
were cited.42
However, the court then embarked upon rulings of questionable
validity, holding that section 301(a) would support a suit to redress
rights if the union interfered with employer promises in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. However, whether section 301(a) would
"support a suit by a union member against his union for failure of the
union to honor rights conferred by union promises in the collective
bargaining agreement... "43 was a different issue.
Interestingly, the court quoted excerpts from a Ninth Circuit case
in the next step of its analysis:
While we have been unable to find any case for the proposition that section
301 will support a suit by a union member against his union for redress from
union refusal to honor rights conferred on employees by union promises in
the collective bargaining agreement, we are convinced that section 301 does
confer such jurisdiction. The union's duty of fair representation is equally vio-
lated when it refuses arbitrarily and in bad faith to honor its obligations,
under a collective bargaining agreement, which is designed to benefit its
members.44
From there, the court made a quantum leap to justify remand to
state court, claiming it did not have the jurisdiction under section
301. The court recognized that the complaint did not allege any
breach by the union of its duty of fair representation, the complaint
alleged only a negligent failure to perform a duty promised under the
contract. Additionally, there were no allegations of arbitrary or bad
faith actions by the union. Finally, there were no allegations of re-
fusal by the union to honor its promises in the collective bargaining
agreement. Thus, the court held that it was without jurisdiction
under section 301.45
The court then analyzed whether the complaint could even be cate-
gorized as a suit for violation of contract. Bryant was distinguished
because (1) in that case the agreement was held to contain a permis-
sive duty as opposed to the affirmative duty in Helton; (2) Helton's
42. Id, at 1029-30.
43. Id, at 1030. See also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971);
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195
(1962).
44. Helton, 386 F. Supp. at 1030.
45. Id. at 1030 (citing Buzzard v. Local Lodge 1040 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, 480 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1973); contra Verville v. International Ass'n
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 520 F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1975).
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complaint alleged a negligent and careless enforcement of safety
rules relating to work in the area of power lines; and (3) the Bryant
court never addressed the question of jurisdiction.46 Therefore, since
the suit was "clearly" one brought in tort seeking recovery for
wrongful death due to the union's negligence, the case could not re-
main in federal court.
What of the contract and its relationship to federal law? What of
the Bryant court's concern about retardation of the national labor
policy? The Helton court had no trouble answering these questions:
That defendants' duty may have arisen under a contract does not in and of
itself change the basic nature of this action, which is a suit in tort to recover
damages for injuries sustained due to defendants' alleged negligence....
Merely because some interpretation of the contract appears to be necessary
to the determination of the nature, scope or extent of the duty owed does not,
in and of itself, categorize this cause as an action for violation of the contract
so as to grant jurisdiction to this Court under section 301(a). 4 7
As if it were wearing blinders, the court looked merely at the
pleading (the nature of the action with no mention of fair representa-
tion), the relief sought, and the claimant bringing the action.48
What appears to have been discarded at this point was the language
in San Diego Building Trades Council v. GarTnon:49
It may be that an award of damages in a particular situation will not, in fact,
conflict with the active assertion of federal authority. The same may be true
of the incidence of a particular state injunction. To sanction either involves a
conflict with federal policy in that it involves allowing two law-making
sources to govern. In fact, since remedies form an ingredient of any inte-
grated scheme of regulation, to allow the State to grant a remedy here which
has been withheld from the National Labor Relations Board only accentuates
the danger of conflict.
5 0
In a last hurrah, the court stated that it would be wrong to grant
jurisdiction under section 301 merely because some interpretation of
a contract would be necessary, even if the alleged wrong were di-
rectly or indirectly related thereto.
46. Id. The jurisdictional question was never addressed because the original suit
was brought in federal court, alleging a section 301 action for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement and a breach of fair representation.
47. Id
48. "Plaintiffs are not praying for reinstatement or back wages, or for an improve-
ment in working conditions. They are not employees or union members, but rather
survivors bringing suit under the Missouri wrongful death law." I&. at 1034.
49. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
50. Id, at 247.
5. Higley v. Disston, Inc.
In Higley v. Disston, Inc.,51 Washington State had the opportunity
to address the same issue. Suit was brought against the union be-
cause an employee/bargaining unit member was injured at his place
of employment as a result of the union-management joint safety com-
mittee's alleged negligent failure to discover and correct the condi-
tion which led to the injury.52
Even though the case was brought in state court, that tribunal did
not confine its analysis to the nature of the complaint. Determining
that the applicable "duty" was one of fair representation, and that
concurrent jurisdiction was present to decide the claim, the court ap-
plied substantive federal law.5 3
The Washington court held that, when the union attempted to im-
prove the working and safety conditions of its members by introduc-
ing into the contract certain provisions dealing with safety, it did not
assume a duty of liability toward its members to provide a safe work-
place. Indeed, it could not be charged with a duty of reasonable care
in making safety inspections. 54
Concluding with a reference to Bryant, and no mention of Helton,
the court gave proper deference to national labor policy, noting that
to permit liability would discourage more effective standards in fu-
ture contracts. Finding no breach, the matter was dismissed. It ap-
pears from the case that, while a fair representation breach may not
have been pleaded as such, the court determined that it was applica-
ble doctrine.
6. House v. Mine Safety Appliance Co.
Several months later, a similar suit was decided in favor of the
union in House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co.55 Following a mine ac-
cident, two companies sued the union seeking indemnification and
contribution from an alleged right of union members to sue. Any
right which these third-party plaintiffs had would rest upon the abil-
ity of the individual union member to maintain that right in the suit.
Again, the same argument recurred: the union undertook a duty to
act as the accident prevention and safety enforcer under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. The union was negligent in that it per-
mitted unsafe conditions to exist by failing to exercise due care and
by not providing a reasonably safe place for members to perform
51. 42 Lab. Rel. Ref. M. 2443 (Wash. Supp. 1976).
52. Id. at 2443-44.
53. Id. at 2444.
54. The decision does not delineate the extent to which the union participated in
the safety program.
55. 417 F. Supp. 939 (D. Idaho 1976).
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their duties. This claimed negligence was the proximate cause of the
damages sustained by the employee.
There was no assertion that the union breached its duty of fair rep-
resentation; rather, reliance was placed upon common law tort prin-
ciples.56 The assumed duty emerged from the collective bargaining
agreement. Among other provisions, the safety committee was to ad-
vise the plant manager of problems, but not to handle grievances.5 7
The court found that any action for damages flowed from the con-
tractual obligation undertaken by the union for the benefit of its
members. "If liability could lie with the union under the common
law, it would be because of negligent performance of a duty assumed
and not a duty otherwise imposed by the common law.... [T]he duty
is one arising under federal law, namely, the duty of fair
representation."5 8
The court held that any lawsuit of this type, even if brought by an
actual employee/member, would be a challenge to the enforcement,
or lack thereof, of the collective bargaining agreement. This time, in
a logical step, the court recognized the "inextricable connection" be-
tween the common law claim and the duty of fair representation
when the cause of action arises from the contract.59 Accordingly, it
refused to sever responsibility for safety from other responsibilities
which flowed from the duty of fair representation.
In short, the negligence theory for breach of an alleged safety duty
was found to be embodied in the union's duty of fair representation.
Alleging negligent performance of contractual duties was not suffi-
cient to state a claim under federal law.6 0
To the House court, it made no difference that the agreement pro-
vided for a mandatory duty ("shall inspect") as opposed to the per-
missive duty in Bryant.6 1 Liability would not automatically be
imposed for personal injuries resulting from a breach of fair repre-
56. Id. at 941-42.
57. 1I
58. Id. at 942.
59. Id. at 943; but cf Marshall v. International Longshoreman's 781, 57 Cal. 2d 781,
371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1962); Inglis v. Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 12, 58
Cal. 2d 269, 373 P.2d 467, 23 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1962), cited in House v. Mine Safety Appli-
ances Co., 417 F. Supp. 939 (D. Idaho 1976) (distinguished by the fact that the action in
House followed from a contractual obligation affirmatively undertaken by the union
while the California cases concerned actions in tort based upon intentional torts com-
mitted by union members).
60. Id. at 945.
61. Bryant, 417 F. Supp. at 944; "Every power granted to a union does not neces-
sarily create a corollary contract right in the employee against his union." Id.
sentation. Hence, because the third-party plaintiffs did not rely upon
a breach of fair representation, they did not state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.6 2
The court also injected public policy into the discussion, noting that
if unions were liable in these types of cases, there would be no nego-
tiation on safety matters.63 Further, an anomaly would result by im-
posing a variety of state tort concepts into a union's duty of fair
representation because the standard of care required of unions would
vary according to the different tort principles of each state. Thus,
union liability would frustrate the precepts of uniformity developed
under federal law.
The court also remarked on the traditional duty of employers to
furnish a safe place of employment. To allow a sanction of legal lia-
bility to accompany a union's exercise of responsibility in safety mat-
ters, together with either loss shifting or sharing, would weaken the
duty of the employer at the expense of the union and its members.
Only the largest and most financially solvent unions might be able to
absorb the loss. 6 4
7. Carollo v. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc.
In 1977, state courts in Pennsylvania lined up in the Bryant and
House camps. In Carollo v. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc.,65 plaintiffs
filed suit when they contracted an asbestos-related disease as a result
of prolonged inhalation of the asbestos fibers. The complaint against
the union charged that since health and safety are mandatory bar-
gaining issues, a duty of fair representation arose whereby the union
had a responsibility to search out the hazards (such as the possibility
of injury by inhalation) so that they could be a subject of bargaining.
Moreover, the complaint charged that the union should have warned
members of the danger of disease or injury arising from the use or
exposure to asbestos, and should have required the company to pro-
vide proper equipment. 66
The issues before the court were: whether the union could be sub-
62. The court stated that:
It is established that as an exclusive bargaining representative, the union has
a statutory duty fairly to represent all of its employees, both in its collective
bargaining with the employer, and in its enforcement of the resulting agree-
ment.... Here if union members had instituted suit it would be a challenge to
the enforcement or lack of enforcement of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. In the Ninth Circuit, a union breaches its duty of fair representation
when its actions or inactions are either arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad
faith.
Id at 944 n.3 (citation omitted).
63. House, 417 F. Supp. at 944.
64. Id. at 946-47.
65. 252 Pa. Super. 422, 381 A.2d 990 (1977).
66. Id at 426, 381 A.2d at 992.
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ject to tort liabilities under state law; and whether such law repre-
sented a permissible state action, or whether it was an intrusion in an
area preempted by federal law.
Following a recitation of Vaca, the court noted what Congress did
not intend the duty to cover; namely, "Congress did not seek to make
the union responsible for its members' working conditions."67 The
Carollo court concluded that an intrusion into an area preempted by
federal law would result if the duty of fair representation were ex-
tended to include a duty to search out and take precautions.
8. Gerace v. Johns-Manville Corp.
In Gerace v. Johns-Manville Corp.,68 the Pennsylvania court faced
a situation where employees sued for injuries sustained as a result of
handling and working with asbestos products manufactured, sold,
and supplied by a company called Rockwool. That company joined
the local and international unions as party defendants, claiming it
was the company's negligence which was directly responsible for the
injury/disease.
Rockwool's claims against the unions included allegations of failure
to fulfill certain duties owed to members: (1) to guard and protect
members' health and welfare; (2) to ensure that the employer ob-
served existing health and safety regulations; (3) to warn the mem-
bership of the potential hazards of asbestos; and (4) to educate the
membership concerning the potential hazards of asbestos.6 9
Rockwool's theory was simply that federal preemption did not pre-
67. Id at 433, 381 A.2d at 995-96 (citing House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 417
F. Supp. 939 (D. Idaho 1976)); Bryant v. International Union, United Mine Workers of
Am., 467 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1972).
A statement by Professor Archibald Cox which reflected the concern of the House
court was also noted:
If the effectuation of national labor policy requires exclusion of state proce-
dures and remedies for conduct of a kind prohibited by national policy, aforti-
ori, the national policy must require the exclusion of state efforts to impose
different substantive restrictions within the area of labor-management rela-
tions. The application of different substantive rules through state tribunals
would multiply the effects of divergencies in procedure, remedies, and inter-
pretation of federal law.
Carollo, 252 Pa. Super. at 434, 381 A.2d at 996 (quoting Cox, Labor Law Preemption
Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1337, 1345 (1972)) (emphasis added). Professor Cox's com-
ment regarding remedies is of particular interest because one of the cornerstones of
the decision in Hechler v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers AFL-CIO, 772 F.2d 788,
reh'g denied, 778 F.2d 793 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1967 (1986) (relied
upon remedy as a reason for the remand to state court).
68. 95 L.R.R.M. 3282 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1977).
69. Id. at 3282-83.
clude the existence of a common law duty of due care founded on
principles of state tort law. Moreover, it argued that the union's duty
was larger than that defined by federal law; the union's duty encom-
passed Rockwool's claims, regardless of whether they might be part
of the collective bargaining agreement. In short, Rockwool con-
tended that the duty of due care is an exception to preemption and
that liability should be shifted to the unions as a result.70
The court disposed of the case in quick fashion. It stated that the
statutory duty of fair representation was the only duty which a union
owes to its members. The court concluded, "We therefore must re-
ject the attempt made here to graft a new obligation on the preexist-
ing federally regulated scheme ... 71
9. Hartsfield v. Seafarers International Union
In Hartsfield v. Seafarer's International Union,72 an Alabama fed-
eral district court was invited to extend the theory of tort liability to
a union member on board a ship. In Hartsfield, a mentally unbal-
anced seaman caused the death of one Mr. Hartsfield while aboard a
Coast Guard ship. His sister (personal representative of his children)
brought suit against the Coast Guard because of its alleged negligence
in failing to discover the assailant's mental condition.73
The plaintiff also brought a claim against the union based upon its
act of providing the crew members. The plaintiff claimed that the
duty to provide a competent crew was performed negligently since
the assailant was included in the crew. The union, it was alleged,
knew or should have known of the unstable and dangerous condition
of this person and the consequent threat that his continued presence
posed to fellow crew members.74
The Death on the High Seas Act and the General Maritime Law
statutes were the touchstones of the complaint against the union. No
wrongful act could be attributed to the union when the death oc-
curred on the high seas or in territorial waters, said the court. It fur-
ther recognized that a labor organization is not required to safeguard
crew members from violence while at sea, and neither is a union in
any position to supervise a crew member under such circumstances.
Hence, the court concluded that that portion of the claim failed to
state facts upon which relief could be granted.75
70. 1d at 3283-84.
71. Id. at 3283.
72. 427 F. Supp. 264 (S.D. Ala. 1977).
73. Id. at 266.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 267. Liability was also denied on the basis that the plaintiff had judg-
ment and satisfaction against a joint tortfeasor in an earlier action on the same facts
and for the same injury. See e.g., Sessions v. Johnson, 95 U.S. 347 (1877); McPherson v.
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The plaintiff also tried to attach liability for the job referral, but
that claim was rejected:
The labor organization maintains no supervision over an individual who is
referred by it to employment and is precluded by contract from interfering
with the authority of the ship's offices. The union cannot guarantee that per-
sonal quarrels among seamen will not arise during a long voyage and result in
sudden violence, injury, or death....
If unions are called upon to respond in tort for injuries to seamen, unions
will in effect be given the duty of providing a safe and seaworthy vessel. Such
a result would reverse the traditional relationship of the master to crew and
would force unions to seek to control the conditions of employment while ves-
sels are at sea. These results could not have been intended to flow from the
Death on the High Seas Act.
7 6
Although the union owed no obligation or duty under maritime
law, it nevertheless did owe a duty toward crew members under la-
bor laws. The court held that the union owed no duty of due care
independent of its duty of fair representation which arose from fed-
eral labor law. No breach of the duty of fair representation was rec-
ognized in the union's alleged improper referral of the attacker.
7 7
10. Farmer v. General Refractories Co.
In Farmer v. General Refractories Co.,78 tort claims that alleged a
union's inadequate protection of workplace, health and safety were
determined to have posed a significant potential for interference with
federal law.
The plaintiff Farmer contracted a disease from exposure to certain
products manufactured by the company. After he sued the company,
it joined the union as an additional defendant. In short, the union
was charged with failing to protect its members from health hazards:
it did not warn or inform them of the dangers of exposure to certain
materials present at the job site; it failed to inform them of the ade-
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 271 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1959); Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co.,
120 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1941).
76. Hartsfield, 427 F. Supp. at 269. The ship's officers, not the union, are required
to prevent harm from occurring where they have reason to believe that such may hap-
pen. Further, "[n]egligent breach of the duty to protect the crew imposes liability
upon the vessel and its owner." Id See also Whitaker v. Blidberg-Rothchild Co., 195
F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Va. 1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1961).
77. i& at 69-70. This is partly because a union has neither authority nor opportu-
nity to monitor the activities of ship crews. Accordingly, if unions are to be held liable,
they will in effect be given the duty of insuring a safe and seaworthy vessel to all its
members.
78. 271 Pa. Super. 349, 413 A.2d 701 (1979).
quacy of wearing apparel and of safe methods of using the
equipment.
The company argued that these "duties" were not within the duty
of fair representation, but rather were of a nonrepresentional nature,
and that the case was distinguishable from Carollo.79 The court dis-
agreed: "The allegations of misconduct in Carollo and here are sub-
stantially the same; the label attached is immaterial."80 The court
concluded that the union did not specifically assume the duties which
Farmer alleged. Moreover, the duties were not presumed to be part
of the duty of fair representation.
To impose such a duty either as an extension of the duty of fair representa-
tion or as some type of common law duty would result in an unwarranted in-
terference with the federal scheme for it would place upon the Local as part
of the collective bargaining process a duty it had never assumed.8 1
The court concluded that a failure to search out hazards and take
proper precautions was not, therefore, within the scope of a union's
duty of fair representation.
11. Brooks v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co.
Brooks v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co. 8 2 was a state
court decision which followed in the footsteps of Bryant and House.
Mr. Brooks sustained an injury to his arm while working on a
machine whose safety switch had been disconnected. After receiving
workers' compensation benefits, he instituted a suit in state court
charging the union with negligence in that the safety committee had
a duty to report and remedy unsafe conditions in the plant. The
safety committee consisted of union and management representa-
tives. The purpose of the committee was to meet and make recom-
mendations to the company which would then implement them at its
discretion. There was no duty on behalf of the committee to inspect
for hazardous conditions. Management had the sole responsibility for
implementing the safety program, based on communications obtained
about conditions on the plant floor from the committee.
The defendant insurance company would visit the plant roughly
once a year and conduct an "eye ball" or "walk-through" tour with
the assistant plant manager. The inspection was not a contractual ob-
ligation on the part of the insurer. Such inspection was not meant to
constitute an undertaking on behalf of the plant or to determine or
warrant that workplaces, machinery, or equipment were safe.
79. 252 Pa. Super 422, 381 A.2d 990 (1977); see also supra note 65 and accompany-
ing text.
80. 271 Pa. Super. at 354, 413 A.2d at 704 (1979).
81. Id. at 356-57, 413 A.2d at 705.
82. 170 N.J. Super. 20, 405 A.2d 466 (1979), cert. denied, 81 N.J. 803, 408 A.2d 806
(1979).
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The essential allegations of the complaint were couched in com-
mon law negligence terms--the union had a safety committee which
owed a duty to report any unsafe condition in the plant, and the com-
mittee failed to perform or negligently failed to perform that duty.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of the union at the trial
court level. Upon reaching the higher state court, the result was the
same. "[IThe issue is not whether the Local breached a duty owed to
plaintiff; rather, as indicated, it is whether such breach, if there was
one, would nevertheless entitle plaintiff to maintain this lawsuit
against the Local."83
First and foremost, the court opined that any obligation which the
Local may have had with regard to safety conditions existed solely by
virtue of the labor contract-hence, a return to the "inextricably in-
tertwined with the collective bargaining agreement" 84 rationale.
Since the plaintiffs relied upon an alleged common law tort com-
mitted by the union (negligent performance of a duty assumed by
reason of the collective bargaining agreement), the state court held
that the union's duty (limited with respect to plant safety) was prop-
erly classified as one of fair representation arising under federal law.
It was then an easy step for the court to recognize that negligence did
not constitute a breach of the fair representation duty.85
Finally, the court discussed the factual distinctions within the labor
contract before it. Where the union appointed persons to the safety
committee only for purposes of reporting conditions and making rec-
ommendations to the company, those acts did not create an obligation
or duty which, even if breached, would give rise to an action for dam-
ages.86 The court opted for the Bryant discussion of federal law, and
the House rationale of the connection between the nature of the ac-
tion and the labor agreement. It rejected Helton.87
12. Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America
Let us again focus on the State of Idaho. This time the scenario is
83. Id. at 28, 405 A.2d at 469.
84. Id. at 33, 405 A.2d at 471.
85. The Brooks court cited Dente v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & P's
Loc. 90, 92 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974). Although the Dente
case had been decided before Helton, the Helton court did not mention it.
86. Brooks, 170 N.J. Super. at 35, 405 A.2d at 473.
87. Id. The court distinguished Helton by noting that under these facts the union,
through the shop steward, assumed an affirmative duty to ensure compliance of the
work-safety rules. In the Brooks case no such duty was assumed by the union.
the state court system. In light of House, one wonders why the case
was never removed to federal court.
Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America8 8 was another case in-
volving a mine accident and a wrongful death suit against a union
and also the state. Against the union, the claim alleged negligence by
misrepresenting its safety concern and expertise, failing to develop
an adequate safety program, and failing to inspect and enforce acci-
dent prevention clauses of the labor contract. The trial court held
the claims were preempted by federal law.
In the Idaho Supreme Court, the union argued preemption under
federal regulation of labor law and, further, that since the claims
were really breaches of fair representation, the issues were within
the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
While both House and Bryant were noted, the court rejected each.
House was not persuasive8 9 and Bryant was distinguished because
that language was permissive instead of mandatory ("shall inspect")
as in the instant case.90
In language disturbing to unions, the court explained that the
claims were not necessarily based upon the duty of fair representa-
tion, and that duty is not the only duty owed by a union to its mem-
bers. Hence, the case fell within the narrow range of exceptions to
preemption as found in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of America.91
It appears the court looked only at the nature of the action:92 "If a
union's unreasonable conduct results in the death of one of its mem-
bers, it should not be excused from liability because of the legal for-
tuity of its organizational status any more than if its conduct brought
death to a nonunion member."93
In taking one parting shot at preemption, it was determined that
any federal interest was only peripheral at best. The interests pro-
tected by state wrongful death statutes were unrelated to those gov-
88. 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 983 (1980).
89. Id. at 528, 602 P.2d at 26. The court held that, because the ruling in House was
based upon "the very trial court decision which is the subject of this appeal," it is
merely persuasive authority. Id.
90. Id. The court focused upon the fact that in Bryant, the collective bargaining
agreement made inspection of the mine by the union voluntary rather than mandatory
as was the case here.
91. 430 U.S. 290 (1977). However, it should be noted that each of the duties al-
leged to have been violated were well within the scope of the contract and not the "ex-
ceptions." See id at 296-97.
92. This is substantiated by the concurring opinion which recognized the action as
a "creature of state statutes, is of substantial local interest, and traditionally has been
committed to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state." Dunbar, 100 Idaho at 546, 602
P.2d at 44-45 (Bakes, J., specially concurring in Part I).
93. Id at 527, 602 P.2d at 25-26.
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erned by federal law.94 The NLRB would not recognize the wrongful
death claims against the union.
Significantly, the Dunbar court failed to note a prior Idaho holding
cited in House some years earlier.95 In that case, Rawson v. United
Steelworkers of America,96 the union was sued for a mine disaster.
There, the Idaho state court opined:
However, in whatever forum this question is presented, that is, a claim of
inadequate representation, the federal law would govern the disposition of the
merits. Negligent performance of its contractual duties does not state a claim
for breach of fair representation. Plaintiffs' complaint is grounded solely on
recognized principles of tort law and the federal labor act does not recognize
that responsibility of the union in its representative capacity. 9 7
In any event, the Dunbar court looked at the pleadings and nature
of the action. The matter was remanded to the state trial court.
13. Globig v. Johns-Mansville Corp.
In Globig v. Johns-Mansville Corp.,98 there was another attempt to
hold a union liable for negligence in asbestos-related illnesses. Here,
the union was the subject of a third-party suit seeking contributions
from the union because it breached its duty to disseminate informa-
tion. Specifically, it failed to inform the employees of possible dan-
gers linked to the material they were handling and the need to use
inhalation devices. In addition, the union failed to conduct informa-
tional programs.
The matter, originally brought in state court under a common law
negligence suit, was removed to federal court where the union as-
serted a preemption argument. Finding that the original plaintiffs, as
union members, could not have sued the union under federal law, the
court held that the third-party suit could not be maintained. 99 Alle-
gations that a union may have negligently represented its members is
insufficient to state a claim under federal law. In other words, com-
94. Dunbar, 100 Idaho at 528, 602 P.2d at 26.
95. See House, 417 F. Supp. at 947. In House, the court focused upon Idaho's
Workmens' Compensation Law.
96. Case no. 17694 (First Judicial Dist., County of Shoshone, 1976). The Idaho
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling as to the fraud claim agianst the
union and remanded the case.
97. House, 417 F. Supp. at 945 (quoting Rawson, Memorandum Decision & Order
at 3).
98. 486 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
99. Id at 740. It relied upon Dente and Brough, to find that "the fact that a union
may have negligently represented its members does not state a cause of action under
federal law." Id,
mon law negligence under state law could not be utilized to accom-
plish what could not be attained under federal law.
The court determined that a union's responsibility to its members
is neither a peripheral concern of federal labor policy nor a deeply
rooted state interest which imposes a duty of care not existing under
federal law.100 Since the union's duty was governed by federal law,
which does not recognize a common law duty of due care, the third-
party complaint was dismissed. The relationships among labor un-
ions, union members, and employers were generally recognized to be
governed by federal law.1O1
14. Bescoe v. Laborers' Union Local 334
In Bescoe v. Laborers' Union Local 334,102 the union referred work-
ers to a company plant. One of the referrals was selected by the com-
pany as a foreman.10 3 The foreman had immediate problems with his
supervisor who threatened to fire him.104 The union told the super-
visor that he could not terminate the foreman, although, in actuality,
the company's authority to terminate the employee did exist.105 The
union said it would "take care of" the foreman, implying that it
would stop or curtail his outbursts. 0 6 The foreman later became em-
broiled in an altercation with another employee and severely injured
him.1O7
Even though the union was successful in obtaining partial sum-
mary judgment on the issue of negligent referral, the jury subse-
quently rendered a verdict against the union and foreman on other
grounds.108 While no issue was raised on appeal as to the negligent
referral, several issues were raised concerning preemption and, ulti-
mately, whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the ac-
tion against the union.'0 9
One of the claims the plaintiff asserted against the union involved
the union's failure to insure and protect other workers on the job site
once it was informed of the foreman's threats of violence and his ac-
tual conduct. This allegation was the only one the court held was not
preempted and, thus, properly before the trial court.110
100. Id. at 740-41.
101. 1& at 741. See Farmer, 430 U.S. at 295-301.
102. 98 Mich. App. 389, 295 N.W.2d 892 (1980).
103. Id at 893.
104. Id at 894.
105. Id
106. Id at 899.
107. Id. at 894.
108. Id. at 900 n.16.
109. Id at 894.
110. Id at 411, 295 N.W.2d at 902. It rested this ruling on state law, holding that
the duty will be determined as a question of state law.
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Plaintiff relied on a tort theory, arguing that the union undertook
to perform a duty actually owed by the company to a third party and
failed to exercise reasonable care which resulted in physical harm to
the third party. 1' In other words, the union undertook at least par-
tial performance of the company's duty to provide a safe workplace
and it failed to exercise reasonable care toward the injured employee.
On a strict tort analysis, the court found no duty was undertaken
on the part of the union. The company did not relinquish its right to
terminate the foreman. Consequently, there was insufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that the union had a duty to insure and
protect the workers on the job site.
15. Szatkowski v. Turner & Harrison, Inc.
In 1982, there were decisions involving three district courts and one
court of appeals including Szatkowski v. Turner & Harrison, Inc.112
Originating in a New York state court, a complaint was filed charging
that the union negligently inspected a work area, having assumed
that duty pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The case
was later removed to federal court.
The union asserted a preemption argument based on section 301,
claiming that any duty owed arose out of the collective bargaining
agreement." 3 In analyzing the argument, the court drew a distinc-
tion between questions involving subject-matter jurisdiction and
those involving the existence of a valid claim upon which relief could
be granted. Regardless of whether the duty arose from the contract,
the performance of the duty may give rise to an action in tort and
provide a basis for the claim against the union. Since the negligence
action arose under state law, the federal court declined jurisdiction.
The existence of a duty under federal law was irrelevant to the ques-
tion of jurisdiction according to the court. If the common law were
preempted by federal law, the only remedy would be in state court to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. This could only be done in state court because it had sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction. Remand was ordered to determine the na-
ture of the claim."4
111. Id
112. 109 L.R.R.M. 2609 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
113. Id, The union defendants had sought to hold federal law applications under
section 301(a) thereby precluding the state law claim.
114. The court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) remanded the case to the New York
County Supreme Court. IM at 2610.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity to address
specifically the preemption-negligence issue. In Condon v. Local
2944, United Steelworkers of America,"i5 employee Condon suffered
severe burns while working as a welder. The original complaint was
brought in state court containing counts predicated on a collective
bargaining agreement. It was alleged that a safety committee was the
agent of the Union which had the duty to monitor conditions, advise
the company, inspect, and insure sufficient safety equipment.1 6 A
second count was based on a breach of contract.
After the matter was removed to district court, additional counts
sounding in tort and contract were added. The allegations of breach
of duty were based on state common law. The plaintiff's claimed
that the Union had an implied duty of reasonable care which arose
independent of the contract.
The court noted that, without the contract, there would be neither
a union nor a safety committee."i 7 Therefore, state law in this area
operated under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Act and
federal law. A union's duty (of fair representation) as the statutory
bargaining agent does not include a duty of due care (as the phrase is
used in tort) and mere negligence does not constitute a breach. Like
House, the court concluded that, where the cause of action flowed
from the contractual obligations undertaken by the union, the duty
arose from, and was governed by, federal law."i8 "A union cannot be
held liable for the negligent performance of a duty it assumed that
arose inextricably, as here, from the safety and health provisions of a
collective bargaining basement .... 119
The underlying policy consideration is the reluctance and, in some
instances, a refusal to impose additional duties on unions for every
provision concerning safety and health that a union is able to extract
in negotiations. The suit was dismissed.
In Mahoney v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool,120 an interesting situation
was presented. First, it foreshadowed the basis of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's fact pattern in Hechler, but decided in the opposite way. Sec-
ond, it is a study in a foregone conclusion because even if the union's
role was negligent, the union was protected by statutory immunity.
115. 683 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1982).
116. Id. at 592.
117. Id. at 594. "The collective bargaining agreement cannot so casually be pushed
aside. Without the collective bargaining agreement, there would be neither a local
union nor a union safety committee." Id.
118. The court noted that it had found only one federal case that permitted a com-
mon-law negligence suit under these circumstances. See Helton v. Hake, 389 F. Supp.
1027 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
119. Condon, 683 F.2d at 595.
120. 111 L.R.R.M. 2839 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
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However, it is worth analyzing the case, for it establishes an interest-
ing dichotomy with Hechler.
Mahoney was injured while working on a die grinder. He sued the
manufacturer of the tool,121 which impleaded the union and
others.122 As a third-party plaintiff, the manufacturer alleged that
the union was involved in the training of Mahoney, his subsequent
supervision and monitoring of safety. Thus, it was alleged that the
union's negligence caused or contributed to the injury.
The allegations are similar to the Hechler complaint: the union
failed to train and test Mahoney adequately and properly, particu-
larly in matters of safety, before certifying him as a journeyman.
The union also allegedly failed to instruct him with regard to applica-
ble regulations in the use of the equipment.
The manufacturer alleged that the union assumed a role in the
training and monitoring of the workplace. This role carried with it
the responsibilities and duties beyond that of fair representation. 123
There was disagreement by the court. Merely because a union
seeks to improve the competence of its members, in order to enhance
their value to their employer, the union does not thereby assume a
nonrepresentational role with additional legal duties and responsibili-
ties. "The court finds that the Union's involvement with the setting
up of an apprenticeship program with the employer and its efforts in
the area of workplace safety are 'inextricably intertwined and em-
bodied in the union's duty of fair representation .... . "'124 Since the
negligent conduct was neither arbitrary nor in bad faith, the conduct
was not sufficient to state a cause of action under federal labor
law.125
The court borrowed a page from Bryant in echoing its concern
about future situations. If a union were to be held liable because of
its role in the establishment of an apprenticeship program, particu-
larly where safety training is involved, it would discourage union ef-
121. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company owned the brand name grinding tool which
caused plaintiff's injuries. Shinano, Inc. was the manufacturer of the tool. Id
122. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company brought in the general contractor, plain-
tiff's employer, The International Brotherhood of Boiler-Makers, Blacksmith Iron
Shipbuilders, Forgers, and Helpers, and Local 169. Id.
123. Id at 2840.
124. Id at 2840 (quoting House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 417 F. Supp. 939, 945
(D. Idaho 1976)).
125. Without more, ordinary negligence cannot establish a breach of the duty of
fair representation. See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981);
Bazarre v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1970).
forts to promote workplace safety by increasing the competence of its
members. Such a result would not aid the interests of the members,
and it would be inconsistent with national labor policy. 126 No duties
of a nonrepresentational nature were foisted upon the union. The
case was dismissed.
Three months later, another decision following the Condon ration-
ale was rendered in Burgess v. Allendale Mutual insurance Co.127
Mr. Burgess was seriously injured at work when his body was pulled
through the rollers and inner parts of a paper machine. The com-
plaint alleged that the union knew, or should have known, of the
existence and maintenance of the unsafe practices and conditions;
moreover, the union breached its duty of fair representation in al-
lowing the practices and conditions to exist.
The portions of the collective bargaining agreement relevant to the
case involved the general purpose clause which acknowledged the
mutual interest of the employer and employees in using methods to
further the safety and welfare of employees. The employees were
expected to cooperate with management's efforts by complying with
all safety rules. Dangerous conditions were to be reported immedi-
ately. Lastly, an employee could be disciplined for violating safety
rules.
In this case, the duty of fair representation, according to plaintiffs,
was defined to include the negotiation and enforcement of safe work-
ing conditions.128
The court reached a quick conclusion that negligence or poor judg-
ment is insufficient to support a claim of fair representation. Per-
suaded by Brough, Bryant, and House, the court found no breach of
fair representation on the issue of whether the union was responsible
for negligent failure to conduct safety inspections.129 The only duty
owed as the exclusive bargaining agent was a duty of good faith rep-
resentation, not a general duty of due care.
Finally, in reaffirming Condon, the court gave deference to the
contract as the source of any duty: "[m]oreover, even if the agree-
ment could be interpreted to impose a duty upon the union, the
courts have refused to hold the union liable for failure to enforce this
duty when it arose from the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement."130 Yet, the lucid teachings of this language were ignored
126. Mahoney, 111 L.R.R.M. 2839, 2841 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
127. 111 L.R.R.M. 2997 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
128. This was based on the fact that the union "assumed by virtue of its actions in
conducting safety inspections at Deerfield," a general duty of due care. Id, at 2998.
129. I. at 2999.
130. Id. at 3000 (citing Condon v. Local 2944, United Steelworkers, 683 F.2d 590, 595
(1st Cir. 1982)).
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by Hechler three years later.'3 l
In Preisler v. United Steelworkers of America,132 a wrongful death
action was brought against the union seeking damages in both con-
tract and tort when a wall collapsed on him at the plant. The collec-
tive bargaining agreement in effect at the time provided for a safety
committee with the union acting "exclusively in an advisory capac-
ity." Moreover, the union was able to negotiate language providing
that it and its committee, officers, agents, etc. were not liable for
work-related injuries, disabilities, or diseases which may be incurred.
Under the negligence theory, it was alleged that the union failed to
exercise its duty of due care in not protecting the decedent from
harm. Under the contract theory, it was alleged that the union
breached an affirmative duty to provide a safe work environment.
In defense, the union argued concurrently that its federal duty of
fair representation preempted a state common law duty of due care,
and that the contract language precluded liability for the injury/
death which occurred. In short, the union acted only in a representa-
tional capacity.
The court agreed. The union was committed, under the collective
bargaining agreement, to a purely representative function. Hence,
only the duty of fair representation controlled its conduct. Relying
on Condon, the court held that the union cannot be liable for the
negligent performance of a duty it assumed that arose inextricably
from the safety provisions of the contract. The union's motion for
summary judgment was granted.133
The union was partially relieved of liability in Curran v. Interna-
tional Union, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers.134 After the plain-
tiff's hand was caught in a machine, it had to be amputated. A safety
committee was already in existence as a result of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
Upon commencement of the suit, two theories were asserted
against the union. The first alleged a state law negligence claim
based on the union's breach of a duty to safeguard the plaintiff from
unreasonable dangers. The second alleged a federal claim for the
breach of fair representation.
On the first theory, the court found that the duty of fair represen-
131. See generally, Hechler v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 772 F.2d 788
(1985).
132. N-83-159 (D. Conn. 1984).
133. Id.
134. 582 F. Supp. 420 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
tation, because it was governed exclusively by federal law, did not in-
clude a duty of care. 35 In the absence of that type of duty, neither a
breach nor a negligence claim could exist. The Condon and House ra-
tionales were acknowledged.
Key provisions of the collective bargaining agreement were re-
viewed in light of the safety committee's duty. In essence, there was
no authority, power, or duty to make policy decisions regarding
safety, as they were retained by the employer.
Based on the language of the contract, the committee's existence
was not entirely optional.136 However, the committee's role was not
entirely dispositive because the issue before the court was whether a
claim of negligence could be directed against the union based on cir-
cumstances arising from the union's obligations (duty of fair repre-
sentation) under a collective bargaining agreement. 3 7 In deciding
the issue, the court relied on Condon v. Local 2944, United Steelwork-
ers, 138 which the Curran court deemed to be "strikingly similar" fac-
tually.139 Based on Condon, the court held that the "alleged duty
arose inextricably from the health and safety provisions of the agree-
ment. The degree to which authority is exercised can do nothing to
change the source from which that authority arose .... ,114o
The court concluded that the claim arose from facts and circum-
stances which "touch upon the union's bargaining duties only in a
tangential way . . . "141 Thus, federal law would not be a bar.142
Farmer-type exceptions 143 were discussed and rejected as inapplica-
ble because the Curran court held that the claim in the Farmer case
had little or nothing to do with the union's function as the exclusive
135. Id. at 422. The court rejected the notion that a common-law negligence claim
could be held against the union.
136. Section 159 of the Collective Bargaining Agreements provided for the creation
of a Health and Safety Committee which would meet with the employer's representa-
tive to discuss health and safety matters. The court held that this arrangement was
strictly advisory and therefore did not impose upon the union an alternative duty to
inspect or otherwise ensure the safety of the working place. Id. at 423. But see Helton
v. Hake, 386 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
137. Id,
138. 683 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1982). Condon involved a negligence claim brought
against the union by one of its members for injuries suffered by the member when his
shirt was ignited by sparks produced during the welding process. As in Curran, the
Condon union had agreed in its collective bargaining agreement to provide reasonable
safety measures. The court ruled that the alleged duty of due care arose, exclusively
from the collective bargaining agreement, and "therefore arose from and was governed
by federal law." Id. at 595.
139. Curran, 582 F. Supp. at 423.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 424.
142. Id.
143. In Special Adm'r. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local 25,
430 U.S. 290 (1977), an exception was carved out for such intentional torts as infliction
of severe emotional distress. Id at 301-02.
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bargaining representative for the members.44 Further, in comparing
the allegations and the unions' rights, functions, and duties under
federal law to the contract, the Curran court found that the nexus
was too close to permit the claim.145
However, the union was still faced with the second count of the
federal claim.X46 A triable issue of fact remained because of the alle-
gation by the plaintiff that the union carried out its duty relating to
health and safety in an "arbitrary manner, exhibiting bad faith."47
A sufficient showing was made that previous accidents had occurred
similar to the one at issue.' 48 Moreover, the court noted that safety
meetings had been held prior to Curran's accident, wherein one topic
of discussion was the safety of the machine.X49 No action was taken
following the meeting, and thus the injury was not prevented. 5 0
Hence, the second count stood.' 5 '
16. McColgan v. United Mine Workers of America
In McColgan v. United Mine Workers of America,152 an Illinois
state court of appeals addressed the issue of whether a union owes a
common law duty of due care which is not preempted by federal law.
Mr. McColgan was injured when he was struck by a mine shuttle car.
It was alleged that the union undertook to monitor and correct un-
safe mine conditions. However, the union failed to install or cause to
be installed certain safety devices, failed to warn its members, and
failed to take remedial action. The suit claimed a duty of due care
was imposed under the union's constitution, bylaws, and collective
bargaining agreement.153
At most, according to the court, the union was under a duty to in-
spect and report safety violations of which it had actual knowl-
edge.'54 The union's undertakings imposed no duty with respect to
144. Curran, 582 F. Supp. at 424.
145. Id.
146. Id
147. Curran, 582 F. Supp. at 424.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 124 Ill. App. 3d 825, 464 N.E.2d 1166 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
153. The union's constitution mentioned local safety committees and provided for
annual committee meetings to resolve safety issues. Under the bylaws, the safety com-
mittee was responsible for maintaining safe conditions and enforcing safety provisions
of the contract.
154. Id. at 828, 464 N.E.2d at 1168.
any negligent omissions.15 5 Additionally, the court ruled that an in-
spection would not have discovered the facts upon which the claims
rested.156
Turning to the preemption issue, the court noted that negligence is
insufficient to state a claim for breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion; rather, using the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, the intentional
misconduct standard must be alleged to sustain a claim based upon a
union's discretionary duties.157 The court summarized its position as
follows:
[t]he unions' decision to emphasize one unsafe condition over another, or to
emphasize wages or hours over safety conditions in their dealings with em-
ployers, involves various and subtle assessments which defy enumeration and
definition. Generally, unions have an incentive to work for the benefit of
their members, thus protection from intentional misconduct should suffice.
1 58
Therefore, to impose a duty to exercise discretion to persuade, ne-
gotiate, or pressure employers to use particular safety equipment
would be an unwarranted intrusion into the collective bargaining
process.
17. Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America
Next, the focus shifts west to Idaho. In Carroll v. United Steel-
workers of America,159 Michael Carroll was injured when a skip cage
fell on him due to a defective hoist. He sued the union in state court
alleging that the duty of due care (including the duty to have discov-
ered the defect) was breached. The recurrent theme was played: the
union undertook to act as an accident prevention enforcer under the
collective bargaining agreement; it did so negligently; it did not de-
velop an adequate program; it failed to inspect; and it failed to re-
quire safety devices to be used.
The state trial court, in finding for the union, could not impose a
legal duty which would give rise to a cause of action in negligence.
When Carroll reached the Idaho Supreme Court, the plaintiff al-
leged three theories through which a duty was owed to him: (1) the
155. The court stated:
[P]laintiffs allege that the unions permitted members to work in an area with
opaque pull through curtains, and it is true that defendants had the power to
force the employer to withdraw workers from areas of power to impose liabil-
ity upon the unions for permitting work in the presence of an unsafe condi-
tion. . . . A duty to withdraw workers from the presence of any unsafe
condition would either close the mines or render the unions' insurers of mine
accidents; we believe such an interpretation to be far out of proportion to the
unions' undertaking.
I& at 829, 464 N.E.2d at 1169.
156. 1& at 828, 464 N.E.2d at 1168.
157. Id. at 829, 464 N.E.2d at 1169 (relying on Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 697
F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1983)).
158. McColgan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 830, 464 N.E.2d at 1170.
159. 107 Idaho 717, 692 P.2d 361 (1984).
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duty was created by contract,16 0 (2) the duty arose by the union's con-
duct in the voluntary assumption thereof, and (3) the duty was estab-
lished by state statute.161
The same justices who wrote and concurred in Dunbar162 came to
a different result in Carroll. Under Idaho state law, an alleged fail-
ure to perform a contractual obligation is not actionable in tort-a
mere breach of the collective bargaining agreement did not rise to
the level of a tort.163 Therefore, the first theory was dismissed. 6 4
The court found no breach of duty apart from the nonperformance of
a contract.165
As to the second theory (voluntary assumption of a duty), Carroll
relied upon the "Good Samaritan" doctrine--one may assume a duty
by voluntary conduct. 6 6 However, since the plaintiff's allegation
averred a failure to take affirmative action by the defendant to pro-
tect him from harm, the court held that there was no "promise" upon
which he could detrimentally rely.16 7 Moreover, Carroll stated that
he was not aware of the provisions of the bargaining agreement as
they related to safety; hence, he could not rely on them.168
Furthermore, because the theory based upon the statutory obliga-
tion16 9 was not raised until reaching the state supreme court, the
court would not determine the issue.170 In conclusion, the court held
160. The collective bargaining agreement required the employer to make reason-
able provisions for safety. The union was to assist in securing cooperation of employ-
ees and encourage employees to cooperate with management in safety matters. There
was a duty to inspect, discuss, and act on any findings, to review safety practices, and
to make recommendations for elimination of safety hazards. "It is agreed that the...
Committee acts hereunder exclusively in an advisory capacity to the Company." Id at
721 n.1, 692 P.2d at 365 n.1.
161. The plaintiff alleged that the provision in Idaho's Minimum Safety Standards
and Practices for Mining and Mineral Industry requiring management to make regular
safety inspections was a law which created an independent duty.
162. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
163. In so concluding, the court cited Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 483 P.2d 664,
669 (1971) (a contract to purchase potatoes was held insufficient to support an action
sounding in tort, absent a law imposing liability independent of the contract); and
Just's Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978), which held that
breach of a construction contract did not create a tort because it lacked "a wrongful
invasion of an interest created by the law, not merely an invasion of interest created
by the agreement of the parties." Id. at 467, 583 P.2d at 1003.
164. Carroll, 107 Idaho at 719, 692 P.2d at 363.
165. Id
166. Id at 720, 692 P.2d at 364.
167. Id
168. Id
169. See supra note 154.
170. The Idaho Minimum Safety Standards and Practices for Mining and Mineral
that the union had no duty which could give rise to a tort action
under the (Idaho) common law or the collective bargaining
agreement.
The anomaly between Dunbar and Carroll is difficult to justify.
Both contracts contained language requiring a duty to inspect, report,
and act. Each case involved a hazard which led to harm. Both cases
raised the issue of whether the union had a duty to inspect, and
whether this duty was breached. Preemption and the duty of fair
representation were not raised in Carroll, but were raised in Dunbar.
The Dunbar court reasoned that the duty of fair representation is
not the only duty which a union owed to its members if the union's
unreasonable conduct results in the death of one of its members.171
The union should not be excused from liability because of the legal
fortuity of its organizational status.172 The court found that the duty
of fair representation did not displace those state-created duties
which prohibit one from engaging in wrongful conduct resulting in
harm to a person or property.173
As a secondary conclusion, it will be recalled that Dunbar rejected
a preemption argument because the federal interest was "'tangential
and remote."'174 The court saw little potential for interference with
the federal regulatory scheme. 175
The same court in Carroll, reiterated its Dunbar ruling that there
was no authority which insulated a union from its negligent and tor-
tious conduct toward one of its members. 176 The Carroll court sought
to distinguish the two matters on the basis that Carroll's case was not
based upon a tort theory-Carroll claimed nonfeasance in the per-
formance of a contractual duty. The allegation in Dunbar concerned
the union's negligence in the undertaking of a collective bargaining
duty.177
18. Pockalny v. Elwell Parker Electric Co. 178
Back to New York, where an unmanned moving forklift struck
Creighton Pockalny, causing serious and permanent injuries. An af-
ter-the-fact investigation revealed that certain directional controls
had been improperly connected. The "deadman switch" had been
disconnected; thus, the power was operative.
Industry law provided for mandatory safety inspections to be made by a safety
committee.
171. Dunbar, 100 Idaho at 527-28, 602 P.2d at 25-26.
172. Id. at 528, 602 P.2d at 26.
173. Id
174. Ird at 529, 602 P.2d at 27.
175. Id
176. Carroll, 107 Idaho at 717, 718, 692 P.2d at 361, 362-63.
177. Id. at 718-19, 692 P.2d at 363-64.
178. Pockalny v. Elwell Parker Elec. Co., 608 F. Supp. 570 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
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A collective bargaining agreement contained provisions regarding
health and safety at the plant. A joint safety committee was under a
duty to make bi-weekly inspections, meet and review safety condi-
tions, and carry out other accident-related duties.
Pockalny's action commenced in state court but was removed to
federal district court. Therein, he alleged that by reason of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, the union assumed an affirmative duty
to seek out and secure corrections of hazards to employees. By not
complying with the contract, the union subjected Pockalny to unrea-
sonable risks and injuries. Since Pockalny was a dues-paying mem-
ber, the union also had a contractual duty to provide him with the
same protection. Moreover, because the union failed to make a timely
inspection and/or because the union made such inspection in a negli-
gent manner, harm occurred.
Although a breach-of-duty allegation was not specifically alleged,
Pockalny did allege that the union had undertaken duties above-and-
beyond the duty of fair representation, and it would be inappropriate
to determine the lawsuit with reference to the duty of fair represen-
tation. Simply put, the claims were premised upon state negligence
law and therefore, the plaintiff contended the entire matter should
be remanded to state court.
Certain documents connected with prior negotiations were the very
basis of the negligence actions. These documents were encompassed
in, and made part of, the collective bargaining agreement. The court
quickly concluded that the plaintiff could not rely upon those docu-
ments to impute some form of due care upon the union, and then at-
tempt to have the enforcement of the contract be determined by
state law.179 "Inasmuch as the ... claims . . .flow from documents
connected with the cba [collective bargaining agreement] negotiations
and the parties' agreement to cooperate to maintain safety ... the un-
ions' obligations undertaken to benefit their members arise from and
are governed by federal law .... "'so
Even though the plaintiff did not allege a breach of fair representa-
tion, the court felt compelled to discuss the policy embodied in the
fair representation doctrine and federal common law relating to neg-
ligence suits brought by members against their unions.'18 The court
found the union to be the exclusive bargaining representative bound
179. Id at 572-73.
180. Id. at 574-75.
181. 1d at 573-74.
by the duty of fair representation. It concluded that the duty of due
care was not encompassed by the duty of fair representation. 8 2
As in Bryant v. International Union, United Mine Workers of
America, 8 3 federal labor policy carried weight with the court. 8 4
The court recognized that deleterious effects upon federal labor pol-
icy could occur if union members were permitted to pursue every
privilege or right the union obtained in negotiations but did not
exercise. 8 5
This court also paid deference to the policy considerations set forth
in House v. Mine Safety Appliances Company:86
It has traditionally been the duty of employers to furnish a safe place of em-
ployment .... To permit a sanction of legal liability to accompany a union's
exercise of responsibility in safety matters, together with either loss shifting
or sharing, would weaken the duty of the employer at the expense of the
union and its members.... Moreover, the result is readily apparent, if unions
could be held liable in cases such as this-there would be no negotiation on
safety matters. To impose liability on the union in a case such as this is
against public policy and would seriously disrupt labor relations policy.
1 8 7
19. Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America
A safety/contract duty issue was decided by the Sixth Circuit in
Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America.8 8 Two union members/employees of a steel company oc-
cupied an improvised shanty, located on company premises. At-
tempting to leave the shanty one day, both were injured and severely
burned. One died. The surviving employee and the deceased's estate
sued the insurance company, seeking damages for wrongful death
and injuries. The estate and surviving employee received favorable
jury verdicts. A settlement was later reached through which the in-
surance company would pay damages.
The union was never a party to the lawsuits or the settlement.
However, Michigan Mutual thereafter sued the union in state court
for contributions toward the settlement, alleging that the union was
responsible for the injuries. It claimed that the union failed, as ex-
clusive bargaining representative for the employees, to require re-
moval from the plant of an allegedly hazardous condition-the
shanty.
The case was removed to federal court where the complaint was
182. Id.
183. 467 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973).
184. Pockalny, 608 F. Supp. at 573-74.
185. Id.
186. 417 F. Supp. 939 (D. Idaho 1976).
187. Pockalny, 608 F. Supp. at 574 (citing House, 417 F. Supp. at 946-47) (emphasis
added).
188. 774 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 10 and 11.
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amended to include two independent claims. The first count con-
tended that, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the
union agreed to perform safety services for its members. Further, it
was argued that the union breached state tort law which imposed a
duty to exercise reasonable care in performing these services, and
that such negligence proximately caused the injuries. The second
count alleged a breach of the union's duty under section 301 of the
agreement to fairly represent its members. The second count was
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.
At the district court level, the court determined that federal labor
law preempts state law when the duty which a labor union owes its
members under a collective bargaining agreement is in issue. As
such, the case was dismissed.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismis-
sal.189 The insurance company claimed there was a duty of reason-
able care in the execution of voluntarily assumed duties and that
these duties survive and exist independently from, and alongside of, a
union's duty of fair representation. The latter duty is breached by
bad faith, arbitrary, or discriminatory conduct.
Relying upon Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,o90 the Sixth Circuit
noted that the relevant question was whether a determination of the
existence and scope of the duty which the union allegedly breached is
"substantially dependent" on an analysis of the terms of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.191 Since the insurance company claimed
the union's duty to provide for safety services originated in the con-
tract itself, the circuit court held that the district court properly dis-
missed the matter. 92
Following Allis-Chalmers, the Sixth Circuit noted that when the
resolution of a state-law claim is found to be substantially dependent
upon an analysis of the contract terms, the claim has to be treated as
a section 301 action or dismissed as being preempted under federal la-
bor law.193
As a caveat, it also noted that Allis-Chalmers has limits.'94 For ex-
ample, section 301 does not preempt all state regulation of the sub-
189. Michigan Mut Ins. Co., 774 F.2d at 106.
190. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
191. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 774 F.2d at 106.
192. Id.
193. Id,
194. Id
stantive provisions of collective bargaining agreements. 9 5 Moreover,
section 301 does not preempt lawsuits that assert rights created in-
dependent of contracts, but related to them in some fashion. 9 6
20. Hechler v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Hechler v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.197 Hechler was an electri-
cal apprentice with Florida Power and Light, who was represented
by the IBEW. In 1982, she was assigned to a job which, she alleged,
was beyond the scope of her abilities and training. She sustained in-
juries while performing the assigned work.
Both the international and local unions were sued on the ground
that they were negligent in failing to provide Hechler with proper
training and a safe workplace. "In sum, plaintiff alleged that the
union had a duty to ascertain that she had the essential training,
background, education, and experience before being assigned to work
in an inherently dangerous workplace such as an electrical substa-
tion, and that the union breached that duty."' 9 8 The plaintiff's alle-
gations that, under the collective bargaining agreement, the union
had a contractual obligation to properly train her and that her inju-
ries on the job resulted from the union's tortious breach of that obli-
gation were the main thrust of her complaint.
The collective bargaining agreement between the parties contained
several safety provisions. 99 First, the foreman or supervisor was
strictly responsible for the enforcement of safety rules. Second, no
employee was required to perform his/her duties which the foreman
or supervisor would consider unsafe. Third, any question concerning
qualifications to perform assignments would be taken to the Supervi-
sor of Apprentice Training who would investigate and report the
findings to the Apprenticeship Committee. And fourth, the decision
of whether an apprentice was qualified to work on certain conductors
would be made by the apprentice himself, the foreman supervising
the apprentice, and the journeymen with whom the apprentice
worked.
Two years after the injury, suit was brought in state court. The
matter was removed to the district court which held that the duty
owed to the plaintiff, in fact, emanated from the contract itself. The
district court held that Hechler had not established the union's negli-
gent activity as being beyond the scope of the employee/union fiduci-
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 772 F.2d 788 (11th Cir. 1985).
198. Id. at 789-90.
199. See id& at 790 n.1, for the text of the collective bargaining agreement.
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ary relationship or unrelated to the contract. Since the case was
properly removed and based on federal labor law, the entire matter
was dismissed under DelCostello v. Teamsters.20 0
The Eleventh Circuit entered the scene. Following a review of the
preemption doctrine, the court began an unnecessary analysis of
whether the gravamen of the complaint alleged either an unfair la-
bor practice, a duty of fair representation claim, or a breach of con-
tract under section 301.201
The court reasoned that since the complaint sounded in tort, even
though a remedy under section 301 would be available (albeit not the
full measure of compensatory damages under state law), there could
be liability on common law negligence grounds for breach of a duty
of care. This tort was not a product of the contract. 20 2 The court
held that the tort claim existed without a contract, and neither sec-
tion 301 nor the contract provided a remedy2O3 despite the court's
statements that the contract "may be of use in defining the scope of
the duty owed .... ",2 4 Indeed, the plaintiff acknowledged the possi-
bility of a remedy under section 301. She wanted compensatory dam-
ages and it certainly appears that the court was willing to help her.20 5
Noting that the duty of fair representation is designed to enforce
the principle that a member not suffer invidious or hostile treatment,
the court opined that such duty does not displace those duties created
by state law which prohibit tortious conduct. 20 6 For example, negli-
gent training and negligent assignment were now in the same class as
libel, violent activity, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 207
Likewise, it cannot be said that by failing expressly to protect or prohibit
acts of negligence by unions, Congress intended to permit unions to engage in
200. 462 U.S. 151 (1983). In DelCostello, the Court decided the consolidated claims
of two petitioners who alleged that their unions had breached their respective collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Both cases, while at the district court level, had been dis-
missed as untimely; both courts applied the federal statute of limitations of six
months, rather than the longer state statute of limitations, contained in § 160(b). The
United States Supreme Court affirmed. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 155.
201. Hechler, 772 F.2d at 789-99.
202. Id. at 794.
203. I&
204. Id "That there may be some reference to a collective bargaining agreement
would not automatically be conclusive that a negligence suit be interpreted as no more
than a section 301 action and, thus, preempted." Id. at 795 (citing Helton v. Hake, 386
F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Mo. 1974)).
205. Hechler, 772 F.2d at 794-99.
206. Id. at 796.
207. Id
negligent acts free of the scrutiny of state courts. Rather, it is far more likely
that Congress "by silence indicate[d] a purpose to let state regulation be im-
posed .... ",208
The court found the duty of fair representation had nothing to do
with training for job safety.209 Its justification was that the duty of
fair representation concerns itself with arbitrary or discriminatory
conduct toward individual members which is in violation of the
union's statutory obligations inherent in its bargaining unit status.210
There was no duty-of-fair-representation action according to the
court because the complaint did not allege that the union failed to
properly represent the plaintiff in a matter against the employer.2 11
If Hechler had refused to take the assignment, claiming she was
not qualified, she could have been disciplined for insubordination or
failing to follow a work rule. The union could have grieved the mat-
ter, raising the issue of whether her lack of qualifications was suffi-
cient justification for refusing the assignment. Once into the
arbitration arena, the entire matter might have been avoided.
The Hechler court decided, too quickly, intentionally or otherwise,
to invoke state relief. Its analysis of federal labor policy was superfi-
cial. For example, it viewed the tort as one of state concern, being
aware of no authority whereby a duty of fair representation displaces
the state-created duty which prohibited one from engaging in tortious
conduct resulting in injury or death.212 That analysis, it seems, was
too simplistic.
Florida would have a concern to protect its citizens from negli-
gence in general, but this concern would not extend to protecting em-
ployees covered by an IBEW collective bargaining agreement when
the alleged negligence arose out of the labor contract. 213 This was
not a business contract which Florida law would govern. Here, the
tort was not negligence in general, but a union's failure to provide a
safe workplace and/or monitor training, all connected with, and aris-
ing out of, a collective bargaining agreement.
The mere fact that the contract may be used to define the scope of
the union's duties should require a finding of preemption. If the par-
ties are permitted to bargain about the assertedly tortious conduct,
such a tort claim is firmly rooted in the expectations of the parties
and must be evaluated under federal contract law.214 If the parties
can agree to waive or alter certain obligations or state law rights,
208. Id. (citations omitted).
209. Id, at 797.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 792-93.
213. See Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1916; see also Local 926, International Union
of Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, on remand, 306 S.E.2d 99 (1983).
214. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1912.
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those obligations can be preempted.215
The contract in Hechler gave birth to the tort. The contract pro-
vided that the appellant was to be trained to perform work under the
contract. She could have refused to do the required work, with arbi-
tration as a remedy to any resulting discipline. Her claims are based
on injuries sustained because she was not trained to do the work re-
quired under the contract. She alleged that the collective bargaining
agreement placed a duty on the union to properly train her.216
It is difficult to understand how the tort could be independent of
the contract.217 If there were no contract, Hechler might never have
worked at the facility or have been trained by the union. Any duty
which the union owed was rooted in the contract. Liability, if any,
should, therefore have been determined under federal law.
The Hechler court noted that the contract was not clear as to who
bore the ultimate responsibility for worker training and safety.218
This should have mandated that the interpretation be handled under
federal law. Indeed, there should have been a return at that point to
Allis-Chalmers' teachings: "Unless federal law governs that claim,
the meaning of... [the] provisions of the labor agreement would be
subject to varying interpretations, and [the] congressional goal of a
unified federal body of labor-contract law would be subverted."219
In cases arising under a collective bargaining agreement, questions
of contract interpretation underlie any finding of tort liability, re-
gardless of whether a state court chooses to define the tort as "in-
dependent" of any contract question. The scope of the duty
undertaken by the union should be ascertained from a consideration
of the contract itself.220 The duty, the breach, and the rights are so
intertwined with the contract that it cannot be said that the Hechler
facts are tangential or remote to the federal scheme.
215. Id. Cf Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1978) (holding that
nothing in the NLRA forecloses state regulation of bargaining on wages, hours, and
working conditions).
216. Hechler, 772 F.2d at 796 n.3.
217. Compare Condon v. United Steelworkers, 683 F.2d 590, 595 (1st Cir. 1982),
wherein the court refused to hold the union liable for negligent performance of a duty
found to arise from the collective bargaining agreement. Condon's facts are distin-
guishable because the case involved conditions of the workplace.
218. Hechler, 772 F.2d at 796 n.3.
219. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1916.
220. See generally ACF Indus., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 641 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1981) (collec-
tive bargaining agreement contract must be interpreted as a whole). But see N.L.R.B.
v. Keller-Crescent Co., 538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976) (policy factors alter usual contract
interpretation considerations in the area of collective bargaining agreements).
The court in Allis-Chalmers was aware of the "artful pleading"
doctrine. It noted that nearly any alleged willful breach of contract
can be restated as a tort claim for breach of a good-faith obligation
under a contract.221 Thus, the whole purpose of section 301, and es-
pecially the arbitration process, could be threatened if the section did
not preempt such claims. 2 2 2
The Hechler decision is disturbing for reasons other than the fact
that the court did not follow Allis-Chalmers. Some three years
before Hechler, the same Eleventh Circuit court ruled on a matter in-
volving a breach of fair representation. 223 Although the matter in-
volved the quality of the union's representation during the grievance
procedure, the court acknowledged the uniformity in circuit decisions
that neither negligence on the part of a union nor a mistake in judg-
ment is sufficient to support a claim that the union's arbitrary and
perfunctory actions amounted to a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation.224 "Nothing less than a demonstration that the union ac-
ted with reckless disregard for the employee's rights or was grossly
deficient in its conduct will suffice to establish such a claim .... 225
The Hechler court felt there could not be a duty of fair representa-
tion because that duty had nothing to do with training for job safety;
rather, the duty dealt with conduct toward individual employees.226
However, if the union were negligent toward the plaintiff in how it
conducted her training, it follows that the duty it undertook arose
out of the contract. If the training were negligent, then that duty
was intertwined with an interpretation of the contract.
In Miller v. United Airlines, Inc.,227 a case determined prior to
Hechler, a California court of appeal had before it some ten causes of
action, one of which was negligence. That court, determining the
claims were tied to the collective bargaining agreement, held that the
availability of damages under state law did not alter a federal pre-
emption finding.228 The Hechler court, it will be recalled, felt that a
section 301 suit would not provide the full measure of damages avail-
able to the plaintiff.229
A year before Hechler, the Ninth Circuit, in Olguin v. Inspiration
Consolidated Copper Co. ,230 noted the frequency with which plaintiffs
attempted to avoid federal law by basing their complaints on state
221. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1915.
222. Id
223. Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 668 F.2d 1204 (11th Cir. 1982).
224. Id at 1206.
225. Id at 1206-07.
226. Hechler, 772 F.2d at 796.
227. 174 Cal. App. 3d 878, 220 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1985).
228. Id. at 889, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
229. Hechler, 772 F.2d at 793.
230. 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
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law in order to escape the exclusive remedy of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. However, one may not avoid federal jurisdiction by
omitting the essential federal law in the complaint or by casting in
state law terms a claim that can be made only in federal law. "A
complaint that is 'artfully pleaded' to avoid federal jurisdiction may
be recharacterized as one arising under federal law.... In suits aris-
ing under collective bargaining agreements, the 'arising under' re-
quirement of 28 U.S.C. [section] 1337 is supplemented by section 301
of the Labor-Management Relations Act .... ,,231
In determining whether a complaint is "artfully pleaded," a court
is not bound to consider only the facts pleaded in the complaint.23 2
Yet, Hechler only looked at the pleadings and the remedy sought.
Several years before Hechler, the Third Circuit viewed the remedy
issue as it applied to section 301 suits.2 3 3 It ruled that section 301
reaches not only to suits on labor contracts, but also to suits seeking
remedies for violations of such contracts. 34 Section 301 should not
be read narrowly. One must not look at the nature of the remedy
sought for an alleged violation, but rather whether the remedy
sought may require a court to interpret a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Section 301 "has been construed to afford subject-matter juris-
diction for the tort of violating a duty of fair representation."23 5 The
court noted that it is not the label attached to the remedy (tort or
contract) which is dispositive of the scope of federal common law.236
With all the signposts illuminated for Hechler, the court took a
wrong turn.
Subsequent to Hechler, cases have been decided with different vari-
ations upon the same theme. For example, in Riley v. Tokola Off-
shore, Inc.,237 the union referred Mr. Riley to the job site. He,
thereafter, sustained a heart attack, allegedly because the work was
too strenuous. Riley filed suit seeking damages under the Jones
Act.238 The company filed a third party complaint against the union
231. Id. at 1472.
232. See Fristoe v. Richards, 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980) (removal allowed
where cause of action apparent from allegations in plaintiff's complaint); see also Gari-
baldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1371 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984) (removal appro-
priate where federal cause of action stated on face of complaint).
233. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co. v. Newspaper Guild, 647 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1981).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
236. Id.
237. 626 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
238. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
for contribution and indemnification, asserting negligence in refer-
ring Riley to the job site.2 39
The company alleged that certain oral promises were breached,
whereby the union had assured that all referred workers would be
medically fit. In the previous negotiation, the subject of referrals had
been a hotbed of discussion. Whether there was an oral promise,
even after the union insisted on no medical prescreening, did not pi-
que the court's interest. Under Allis-Chalmers, the court was fore-
closed from enforcing a contract which modified or was dependent on
an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
Questions relating to what the parties agreed to in a labor agree-
ment, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from that
agreement, made little difference to the court since such resolutions
must be determined by reference to uniform federal law--even if the
questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or a suit
alleging liability in tort for negligent referral. 240 Any developments
in the state law governing negligent referrals must defer to Allis-
Chalmers. Even assuming there was a duty to prescreen, the tort of
negligence is substantially, if not entirely, derived from the con-
tract.241 Whether, as argued by the company, there was a self-im-
posed duty on the union's part, such argument was categorized as
"artful pleading".2 42
In addition to the tort claim, the company raised a Farmer-type ex-
ception to preemption, alleging that California had a substantial in-
terest in regulating the conduct of negligent referral. The court
determined otherwise: "The most telling proof that the state of Cali-
fornia has no substantial interest in the claimed tort of 'negligent re-
ferral' is the fact that the parties could have waived any purported
duty. They, in effect, agreed to just that in the CBA."243
State law tort causes of action, ranging from wrongful termination
to intentional interference with economic advantage, were found to
be preempted in Evangelista v. Inlandboatment's Union of PaciiC.2 44
Resolution of those claims was preempted because they hinged upon
an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.245 All
claims were dependent thereon. In citing Allis-Chalmers, the Ninth
Circuit echoed the same concern about the possibility of having indi-
vidual contract terms being given different meanings under state and
239. Cf Hartsfield, 427 F. Supp. at 264; Bescoe, 98 Mich. App. at 389, 295 N.W.2d at
892.
240. Riley, 626 F. Supp. at 618-19.
241. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1913.
242. Id
243. Riley, 626 F. Supp. at 619.
244. 777 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1985).
245. Id
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federal law. If that were done, a disruptive influence might effect
the negotiation and administration of such agreements. 246
The State of California was not to be denied its place in this area.
In Friday v. Hughes Aircrqft Co.,247 Thomas Friday was terminated
from Hughes Aircraft. Rather than filing a grievance under his col-
lective bargaining agreement, he sued his employer in state court, al-
leging state causes of action (bad faith/wrongful termination and
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
One of the allegations in Friday's complaint dealt with safety (re-
porting violations of hazardous waste), but since that matter was cov-
ered in the labor agreement, such tort claim was found to be
"inextricably intertwined" with the collective bargaining
agreement.2 48
The trial court granted the company's summary judgment motion
because, inter alia, the matter was preempted. The state appellate
court followed Allis-Chalmers in holding that those relationships cre-
ated by collective bargaining agreements are to be defined by apply-
ing federal common law grounded in national labor policy. 249
In a recent pronouncement covering this area, the Idaho Supreme
Court in Rawson v. United Steelworkers of America,250 followed its
ruling in Carroll.251 In Rawson, minor children and heirs of deceased
miners sued the union as a result of the same disaster which gave
rise to Dunbar.252 On a theory of fraud, the plaintiffs sought to hold
the union liable for false representations that it made and which
were the proximate cause of the deaths. This fraud claim was dis-
missed, as there were no representations made by the union.25 3
On a theory of negligence, the plaintiffs alleged the existence of a
collective bargaining agreement which gave rise to a duty on behalf
of the union to insure safety. One of the alleged breaches was that
246. This concern did not move the Hechler court even though the contract "may
be of some use in defining the scope of the duty owed." Hechler, 772 F.2d at 794. Since
the scope of the duty would call for an interpretation of the contract, state law should
be preempted according to Allis-Chalmers.
247. Friday v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 188 Cal. App. 3d. 117, 228 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1986)
(review granted July 24, 1986).
248. Id. at 123, 225 Cal. Rptr. 164.
249. Id.
250. 111 Idaho 630, 726 P.2d 742 (1986).
251. Carroll v. United Steelworkers of Am., 107 Idaho at 717, 692 P.2d at 361.
252. Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of Am., 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).
253. Rawson, 111 Idaho at 631, 726 P.2d at 745.
the union did not properly train the miners in the use of self-rescue
devices (somewhat akin to Hechler).
The Idaho Supreme Court ruled against the union.254 The court
found the case to be distinguishable from its decision in Carroll on
the grounds that, in Carroll, the union failed to affirmatively conduct
safety inspections which allegedly amounted to active negligence.255
In the instant case, however, the court noted that "the safety com-
mittee did inspect the mine and the miners allege not that the union
members of the safety committee failed to inspect .. . "256 but
rather, the union improperly inspected the work area and failed to
report obvious safety problems.257 As the cause of action arose from
the collective bargaining agreement, a tort action could be main-
tained therein. Hence, under Idaho law, a failure to perform a con-
tractual obligation (nonfeasance) is not actionable in tort, whereas
malfeasance may very well be actionable under Rawson.
The state trial court in Rawson invited the state supreme court to
review its holding in Dunbar concerning preemption. The invitation
was declined.258 However, the dissent in Rawson commented on the
issue and on Allis-Chalmers. In short, the dissenters distinguished
Rawson because they did not see the need to interpret a contract.
Rather, the plaintiffs were suing for breach of a duty to inspect and
report unsafe conditions under the reasonable and prudent person
standard.259 The contractual provisions determined only the nature
and scope of the union's duty. The duty of due care was key to the
dissent, which applauded the correct analysis of the preemption issue
as determined by Hechler.2 60
CONCLUSION
Work accidents or deaths in the workplace are extremely unfortu-
nate occurrences. Unions are in the business of protecting their bar-
gaining-unit members and seeking better conditions for them. Yet,
254. Id. (at least to the negligence cause of action against the union).
255. Rawson, 111 Idaho at 634, 726 P.2d at 748.
256. Id
257. Id,
258. I& at 639, 726 P.2d at 752.
259. Id.
260. As one author has pointed out:
Defendants often characterize section 301/DFR plaintiffs as paranoid. But
if the latter's view of the labor-management world is a little distorted, it is no
wonder. Employees who have been wronged by their employer and aban-
doned by their union usually become hostile, bitter, and emotionally upset.
Their former allies ... have turned against them. They tend to see union and
management groups as a monolith, working together to defeat their
objectives.
Paul H. Tobias, The Plaintiff's Perception of Litigation, in THE CHANGING LAW OF
FAIR REPRESENTATION 130 (J. McKelvey ed. 1985).
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unions find themselves as defendants in lawsuits for alleged failures
of those very conditions they sought to protect on behalf of their
members. Widows, children of the deceased, and families of the per-
manently injured breadwinner do not care about the complexities of,
or reasoning behind, preemption or a uniform labor policy. They
care about recompense because their loved ones have died or have
suffered injury. Their sobering reality is that the paycheck is
gone.261
What can unions do to continue to protect their members while
protecting themselves? Upon a review of the applicable cases, it is
apparent that any safety and health article in a collective bargaining
agreement should include and reaffirm the principle that the em-
ployer retains exclusive responsibility to provide a safe and healthy
workplace as well as safe conditions of employment.
It should also be spelled out that it is not the intention of the par-
ties to diminish the employer's exclusive responsibility or to make
the union and/or its officers, agents, or other representatives liable
for an employee's job-related injury, illness, or death.
A union should not agree to any language whereby it assumes any
of the employer's exclusive responsibilities to provide safety in the
workplace. Irrespective of how broad the scope of the union's activi-
ties may be, its role should be no more than an advisory one.
Contract provisions should be included which empower workers to
be able to refuse an assignment if there is a reasonable, good faith
belief that there might be harm if the assignment were performed.
Possibly a side letter agreement might be feasible whereby an em-
ployer would agree to indemnify the union, should the latter be
found liable for any occupationally-caused injury, illness, or death.
This device could offset an employer's argument of indemnification.
Liability insurance could be obtained covering the acts or omissions
of the union or its officers, agents, or other representatives in ad-
ministering or enforcing the contractual provisions covering safety.
In any event, a union should never be a guarantor of safety or an in-
surer against workplace accidents or make any promises to protect
workers in these situations.
Finally, in any publications which are distributed, unions should be
careful in describing their responsibilities, duties, or roles with re-
gard to workplace safety.
Unions cannot abandon their watchdog obligation to police and ad-
261. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161, 2168 (1987).
minister the contract, especially when it encompasses safety for its
members; otherwise, they are rendered politically and practically im-
potent. The way in which this is accomplished could prevent
litigation.
It is apparent that the United States Supreme Court has rectified
the problem caused by Hechler. However, it highlighted one caveat
which was the downfall of the union's position in Helton v. Hake :262
whether a union actually assumes a duty of care in the safety provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement. A court would have to de-
termine if there was an implied duty of care on the union, the nature
and scope of that duty, and the extent of the union's duty to the par-
ticular responsibilities alleged in a complaint.263
In this author's opinion, a union should not assume the duty of
care beyond its duty of fair representation. Action in a political
arena is one thing-defending those actions is quite another.
262. Id. See Helton, 386 F. Supp. 1027.
263. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. at 2168.
